The Austerity Framework and Semantic Normativity by Pinder, Mark
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The Austerity Framework and Semantic Normativity
Journal Item
How to cite:
Pinder, Mark (2018). The Austerity Framework and Semantic Normativity. Inquiry (Early Access).
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor Francis Group
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/0020174X.2018.1557543
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
1 
  
The Austerity Framework and semantic normativity 
Mark Pinder 
The Open University 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in Inquiry (2018) 
http://www.tandfonline/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1557543 
Abstract. According to Herman Cappelen’s Austerity Framework, conceptual engineering doesn’t 
involve concepts, and barely involves engineering. I begin by raising two objections to the Austerity 
Framework as it stands: the framework cannot account for important normative aspects of conceptual 
engineering; and it doesn’t give us an adequate response to Strawson-style objections that conceptual 
engineering serves only to change the subject. I then supplement the Austerity Framework with an 
account of semantic normativity, which builds on the speaker/semantic meaning distinction, and show 
that so-supplemented the Austerity Framework successfully overcomes the two objections. I tentatively 
conclude that semantic normativity should play a key role in how we understand conceptual 
engineering.  
Key words: conceptual engineering; austerity framework; semantic normativity; limits of revision. 
1. Introduction 
Many concepts, it seems, are deficient. They may be insufficiently precise for theoretical 
inquiry, they may obscure important distinctions, they may be politically charged, or 
something else. To deal with this, one may seek to refine one’s concepts. This is called 
conceptual engineering. 
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Here is a simple example.1 On discovering that there are many rocky and icy objects 
with orbits and sizes quite similar to those of Pluto, including an object, Eris, more massive 
than Pluto, astronomers deemed the everyday concept of planet to be inadequate. The concept 
lacked an accepted definition, making it unclear whether the discovery of Eris constituted the 
discovery of a tenth planet. Eris, it seemed, was a borderline case. As such, astronomers 
voted on a new concept of planet to replace its predecessor—a concept that definitively 
excluded Eris, as well as Pluto and other similar objects. Call this the Planet Case. 
According to Herman Cappelen’s Austerity Framework (2018), conceptual 
engineering doesn’t involve concepts, and barely involves engineering.2 First, driven by 
concerns about the nature of concepts combined with an appeal to simplicity,3 Cappelen 
writes that “conceptual engineering should be seen as having as its goal to change extensions 
and intensions” (p. 61). Thus, in the Planet Case, the astronomers did not strictly speaking 
define a new concept to replace the old. Rather, they changed the intension and extension of 
the word “planet”. In what follows, I will call the intension and extension of a word or 
expression its meaning; and I will call the process whereby one seeks to change (and 
improve) the meaning of a word or expression amelioration. 
Second, motivated by metasemantic externalism in the Kripke/Putnam tradition,4 
Cappelen denies that we are generally in the position to engineer the meanings of our 
expressions—that is, to bring about the changes we want to make to intensions and 
extensions (pp. 61–84). Here, metasemantic externalism is the view that external factors—the 
environment, experts, complex patterns of use, etc.—are involved in determining the 
                                                 
1 See Tyson 2009. 
2 Unaccompanied page numbers in what follows refer to Cappelen 2018. 
3 E.g. pp. 141ff. 
4 Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975. 
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meanings of expressions, in such a way that there is a genuine possibility that speakers are in 
massive error about those meanings. On this view, the mechanisms that result in changes of 
meaning are complex and, importantly, there is no algorithm for effecting such changes. 
Cappelen thus endorses the following two claims: 
 Inscrutability: The processes involved in conceptual engineering are for the most part 
inscrutable. 
 Uncontrollability: For the most part, we lack control of the processes involved in 
conceptual engineering. 
In the Planet Case, then, the astronomers were not able to control the intension and extension 
of “planet” simply by voting. If the astronomers’ efforts were nonetheless successful—i.e. if 
“planet” now has the meaning the astronomers voted for—then: by Inscrutability, it is unclear 
precisely what effected the desired changes; and, by Uncontrollability, the astronomers were 
to some degree lucky that their efforts were successful. 
As it stands, the Austerity Framework faces at least two objections: it does not 
provide an adequate account of the normativity of conceptual engineering; and it does not 
successfully alleviate the concern that conceptual engineering serves only to change the 
subject. I believe, however, that both of these objections can be overcome if we build an 
account of semantic normativity into the Austerity Framework. To fully understand the 
process of conceptual engineering, so goes the thought, one must be sensitive to the 
competing norms guiding our use of language. Semantic norms are inherently conservative, 
guiding us away from amelioration, and on any given occasion the acceptability of 
amelioration turns on whether these semantic norms can be overridden. Or so, at least, I will 
argue. 
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2. Two Objections 
2.1 The Normativity Objection 
Cappelen claims that—despite Inscrutability and Uncontrollability—conceptual engineers 
“should keep trying” (p. 72). At face value, this is something of a surprise: if we can neither 
achieve, nor even see how in principle to achieve, something, then it might seem wise to turn 
our attention elsewhere. Cappelen responds to this with an analogy: 
If you think your views and theories about crime in Baltimore or poverty in Bangladesh will 
have a significant or predictable effect on either, you’re extremely likely to be disappointed 
(and to end up feeling you’ve wasted the part of your life that has been devoted to these 
issues). […] What I say about conceptual engineering […] doesn’t make the activity of trying 
to engineer concepts much different from a wide range of other human efforts to think about 
how things should be. (pp. 200–201) 
The idea, as I understand it, is as follows. We should try to reduce crime in Baltimore and 
poverty in Bangladesh, because there should be less crime in Baltimore and less poverty in 
Bangladesh. By analogy, we should try to ameliorate some of our expressions, because those 
expressions should have different intensions and extensions. 
I have two points to make about this analogy. First, it fails to capture the full extent of 
the normativity involved in conceptual engineering. Consider the following claims: 
(1a) The astronomers were right to (re)define “planet”. 
(1b) Had the astronomers continued to use “planet” without (re)defining it, they would 
have been doing something wrong. 
On the assumption that the astronomers were to continue using “planet” and given the 
unclarity over the status of Pluto and Eris, it seems that, in an appropriate sense, the 
astronomers were right to (re)define “planet” and would have been wrong not to. Here, the 
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appropriate sense of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ is not (say) moral or legal: the astronomers were not 
fulfilling a moral or legal requirement in (re)defining “planet” and then using the new 
definition. Rather, the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ seem to have a mixed prudential, epistemic and 
semantic flavour: the astronomers’ theoretical aims, the norms of inquiry and the norms 
governing language all seem to contribute to why they were right to act as they did. Exactly 
how these different norms contribute to (1a) and (1b) is something to be explored. 
Consider also, and perhaps more controversially, the following: 
(2a) Having voted for the new definition of “planet”, the astronomers were right to treat 
“planet” as having that new definition—regardless of whether the astronomers had 
successfully changed the meaning of “planet”. 
(2b) Having voted for the new definition of “planet”, had the astronomers not treated 
“planet” as having that new definition, they would have been doing something 
wrong—regardless of whether the astronomers had successfully changed the meaning 
of “planet”. 
Given that the astronomers had agreed upon a definition for “planet”, it seems that, in an 
appropriate sense, they were subsequently right to use “planet” accordingly, and would have 
been wrong not to. Here, for Cappelen, the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ cannot be semantic: given 
Uncontrollability, the astronomers cannot change the meaning of “planet” simply by a vote. 
Nonetheless, it is highly plausible that, in pursuit of good astronomical practice, astronomers 
ought subsequently to have used “planet” as if its meaning had been changed.   
However, (1a)–(2b) go far beyond the very general normative claims that Cappelen 
considers. For example, to say that we (people in general) should try to reduce crime in 
Baltimore is not to say that any particular group of people would be wrong not to try to 
reduce crime in Baltimore. Moreover, on Cappelen’s analogy, the analogues of (2a) and (2b) 
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would just be bizarre. The analogue of (2a) might be as follows: were we to decide on what 
the new rate of crime in Baltimore should be, we would be right to treat crime in Baltimore as 
having that new rate. The analogue of (2b) might then suggest that we would be wrong not to 
treat crime in Baltimore as having that new rate. But any such claim would be absurd: we 
ought not to pretend that the crime rate is lower than it in fact is, because that is tantamount to 
ignoring the problem. So Cappelen’s analogy does not help us to make sense of why the 
astronomers were right to treat “planet” as having the new definition, and would have been 
wrong not to. The upshot is this: if we understand the normativity in conceptual engineering 
simply in terms of Cappelen’s analogy, then we underestimate the extent of that normativity. 
The second point about the analogy is this. It is plausible that we should try to reduce 
crime in Baltimore and poverty in Bangladesh only because there seem to be sensible 
strategies to try. Crime in Baltimore might be reduced by improved training of police 
officers, or by a more strategic focus on the prevention of crime, or by increasing gun control, 
and so on. Poverty in Bangladesh might be reduced by improving the public services 
provided to the poorest regions, by increasing public investment in energy and infrastructure, 
by training its youth to create a generation of skilled workers, and so on. Of course, such 
strategies might fail or have other unforeseen consequences, but they are nonetheless sensible 
strategies to try to reduce crime in Baltimore and poverty in Bangladesh. If there were 
literally nothing sensible that we could do to try to achieve those goals, then it would not be 
clear that we should try. For example, while a world without crime would be wonderful, it is 
not plausible that we should try to eliminate all crime, because there is no sensible strategy 
for achieving such an aim. For it to be plausible that we should try to Φ, we require some 
sensible strategy to follow in trying to Φ. 
However, as it stands, the Austerity Framework does not provide a strategy for 
ameliorating expressions. Inscrutability and Uncontrollability together suggest that we are 
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largely helpless with regard to the meanings of our expressions. And, while Cappelen does 
discuss some of the mechanisms that may underlie meaning shifts—such as a suitable 
intention in a ‘historical chain of submission’,5 or a change in the ‘dominant source of 
information’6—he acknowledges that these mechanisms provide “precious little guidance in 
particular cases” (p. 66). The worry is that, as things stand, the Austerity Framework does not 
make it plausible that we should even try to ameliorate our expressions. 
Drawing these points together, then, the Normativity Objection is this. Conceptual 
engineering is in part a normative enterprise, but the Austerity Framework as it stands fails 
to capture this: (a) insofar as the framework captures the normativity at all, it severely 
underestimates the extent of the normativity; and (b) without sensible strategies for effecting 
changes in intension and extension, it is unclear that the framework leaves room for any 
normativity in conceptual engineering at all. 
2.2 The Topic-Continuity Objection 
Strawson (1963) famously objected that, in philosophy, Carnap’s (1950) method of 
explication serves only to change the subject.7 The objection generalises: whenever a 
conceptual engineer seeks to ameliorate an expression, there is a standing concern that she 
will only succeed in changing the subject. 
Cappelen’s principal response is that sameness of topic is more coarse-grained than 
sameness of intension and extension (pp. 107–121). One can change the intension and 
extension of one’s expressions without thereby changing the topic. For example, even 
supposing that the astronomers successfully changed the intension and extension of “planet”, 
                                                 
5 This is Kripke’s (1980: 163) suggestion, quoted in Cappelen 2018: 65. 
6 This is Evans’ (1973: 199–202) suggestion, mention in Cappelen 2018: 66. 
7 See Pinder 2017a for further discussion of Strawson’s objection. 
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we don’t think that the planetary sciences began in 2006: astronomers have been studying 
planets for hundreds of years, despite the fact that what counts as a planet has changed over 
that time. Of course, some changes in intension and extension do constitute a change of topic: 
someone who complains about the trolls on an internet message board is not discussing the 
same topic as someone who complains about the trolls in her game of Dungeons and 
Dragons. Some changes of intension and extension constitute a change of topic; others do 
not.  
For Cappelen, the key question is this: how much can an intension and extension 
change without resulting in a change of topic? Or, more succinctly: What are the limits of 
revision? Cappelen’s answer is, effectively, that we should decide on an ad hoc basis what 
the limits of revision are. This is captured by the Contestation Theory:  
there are no fixed rules for how far revision can go. The limits of revision are themselves up 
for revision, contestation, and negotiation. If there are any rules here at all, it’s that we make 
up the rules along the way. (p. 116) 
This theory is to be understood as normative: we should take the limits of revision to be itself 
up for revision, contestation and negotiation.8 
The normative nature of the Contestation Theory is brought out by Cappelen’s 
discussion of Railton.9 According to Railton, a topic is in fact preserved across a conceptual 
revision just if the concept’s job description is preserved. Here is Cappelen’s example of a 
‘Railton-style job description’: 
The job description of a concept, say “Freedom”, has three components: 
                                                 
8 Cappelen suggests that, to give a descriptive account of the limits revision, we would need to study genealogies, i.e. 
conceptual histories. However, Cappelen argues that we are nowhere near being in the position to perform such studies. As 
such, I put his discussion of genealogies to one side. See pp. 117–118. 
9 See Cappelen 2018: 120–121, and Railton 1993: 46. 
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(i) Truistic claims about Freedom (e.g., it has something to do with agency, 
responsibility, volition, etc.) 
(ii) Paradigm instances of Freedom (e.g. those are instances of free acts) 
(iii) Inferential relations that Freedom figures in (e.g., if some act reduces freedom, then it 
is—ceteris paribus—bad).  (p. 120) 
 Cappelen’s principal objection to Railton is that the proposal 
seems to be the result of primarily armchair reflection by Railton himself. I don’t think we 
should trust our armchair assumptions about topic preservation. In order to propose a theory 
an enormous amount of careful empirical work is needed. Whether the topic has been 
preserved is not even in the neighbourhood of an a priori question. (p. 121) 
Notice that, although Cappelen does not undertake careful empirical work in support the 
Contestation Theory, he objects to Railton’s theory precisely because it is not supported by 
empirical work. This is not a case of double standards, but a reflection of the different 
statuses of the two theories. Cappelen treats Railton’s theory as a descriptive theory about 
when, in fact, topics are preserved. Cappelen’s view is that we lack anything like the relevant 
data to determine whether Railton’s theory is true.10 In contrast, the Contestation Theory is a 
normative theory about how, going forward, we should decide whether the topic has been 
preserved. Thus, the Contestation Theory does not require support from careful empirical 
work. Rather, it is “a continuation of the fundamental spirit of conceptual engineering”, a 
“critical and questioning spirit [that] is naturally applied to the constraints on ‘sameness of 
topic’” (p. 119).  
As a response to Strawson-style objections, however, this is inadequate. Accepting the 
Contestation Theory for the sake of argument, the standing concern raised above—that, in 
seeking to ameliorate an expression, one will only succeed in changing the subject—remains 
                                                 
10 See pp. 117–118. 
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a standing concern. The mere possibility of staying within the limits of revision, combined 
with the view that we should take those limits to be up for negotiation, does not alleviate the 
concern that one will ultimately go beyond the limits of revision.  
Suppose, by analogy, that it is important to me that my article be considered for 
publication at a particular journal, and so it is important to me that the article fall within the 
journal’s scope. Suppose, moreover, that I am genuinely concerned that my article might fall 
beyond the scope of the journal. Being told that we should take the limits of the scope to be 
up for revision, contestation and negotiation, or that the rules are made up along the way, will 
not alleviate my concern. The added uncertainty may even heighten it. To alleviate the 
concern, I need to have some grasp of the kinds of situation in which, if all goes right, articles 
will be deemed to fall within the scope; I need at least some grasp of whether we should take 
my article to fall within the scope. This is not to deny that what falls within the scope is 
essentially up for negotiation: it is to deny that merely acknowledging the fact is sufficient to 
alleviate the underlying concern.  
Likewise, to adequately respond to a Strawson-style objection, we need more than to 
acknowledge that the limits of revision should be up for negotiation. Such an 
acknowledgement does not alleviate the concern that, in a given case, amelioration will 
change the subject. In addition, we need some grasp of the kinds of situation in which, if all 
goes right, amelioration will fall within the limits of revision; we need some grasp of 
whether, in a given case, we should take an amelioration to fall within the limits of revision. 
The Topic-Continuity Objection, then, is this. As it stands, the Austerity Framework 
does not provide us with the resources to overcome Strawson-style objections: it does not 
alleviate the concern that, if an individual seeks to adjust the intension/extension of an 
expression, she will only succeed in changing the subject. 
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3. Semantic Normativity 
I suggest that the Normativity and Topic Continuity Objections can be overcome by 
supplementing the Austerity Framework with an account of semantic normativity. Here, I 
will only briefly motivate and sketch the account of semantic normativity I have in mind.11 
Nonetheless, the account draws support from its utility in illuminating both the normative 
aspect of conceptual engineering, and the kinds of situation in which conceptual engineering 
should be taken to change the subject.  
To begin, it will be useful to distinguish between two closely related suggestions 
about semantic normativity in the literature. According to the first, what a speaker means by 
a word has implications for how she ought to apply that word. According to the second, what 
a word semantically means has implications for how a speaker of that word ought to apply 
that word. For example, respectively: 
(P1) S means F by w → ∀𝑥 (S ought not to (apply w to 𝑥) ↔ 𝑥 is not f ) 
(P2) w means F → ∀𝑥 (S ought not to (apply w to 𝑥) ↔ 𝑥 is not f ) 
where S is a speaker, w is a word, F is its meaning, and f is the feature of an object in virtue 
of which w applies to that object.12  
The distinction between speaker meaning and semantic meaning is familiar.13 I 
understand it along the following lines: speaker meaning is what a speaker intends to mean 
by her words; semantic meaning is the meaning assigned to the word by the speaker’s 
                                                 
11 The account was initially developed in 2013, in joint research with Thomas Richardson. 
12 The latter formulation is due to Whiting 2007, 2009. The former formulation is closer to Kripke’s (1982) discussion of 
semantic normativity, and how Hattiangadi (2006, 2009) glosses Whiting’s view. See Whiting 2016 for critical discussion of 
alternative accounts of the normativity of meaning. 
13 See especially Grice 1989. 
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language. Here, we can assume that the speaker’s language is a public language, perhaps such 
as English or French or dialects thereof.14 Importantly, though, one can speaker-mean F by w 
regardless of whether w semantically-means F in one’s language. Here are some brief 
examples to illustrate: 
• Anna momentarily forgets the word “carafe” at the dinner table and utters: “please 
can you pass me the thingamajig of wine?” Plausibly, Anna means carafe by 
“thingamajig”, although “thingamajig” has no specific meaning in her language. 
• Kathryn often mixes up the names of her sister, Penny, and daughter, Claire. On one 
occasion, Kathryn tries to get Claire’s attention (and knows that it is Claire whose 
attention she is trying to get) and says “Penny! Claire! Claire!” Plausibly, Kathryn 
meant Claire by “Penny”, although “Penny” means Penny in her language. 
In what follows, I simply assume that we can appeal to this intuitive distinction. 
One might be tempted to object to (P1) and (P2) by questioning the strength of ‘ought’ 
as it features in those principles. One could certainly construct a scenario in which, 
intuitively, one ought to apply “gunpowder” to charcoal shards because, in doing so, one 
would thwart a terrorist’s attempts to build a bomb. But such worries are easily sidestepped.15 
In (P1) and (P2), the ‘ought’ is to be understood as a strictly semantic ‘ought’—and, 
importantly, such an ‘ought’ might be overridden in various occasions by competing moral, 
legal, prudential and other ‘oughts’. With this qualification in place, such scenarios are 
handled easily. 
                                                 
14 This is fair, given that the Austerity Framework plausibly treats semantic meaning as belonging to public languages. For 
example, Cappelen takes it to be an empirical question whether the semantic meaning of an expression has changed, to be 
determined by detailed study of how the expression was/is used by different people. (See e.g. p.118. Cf. pp. 164f.)   
15 See e.g. Whiting 2009: 546f. 
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Nonetheless, (P1) and (P2) are problematic for at least two reasons. First, they make 
lying—and speaking falsehoods more generally—a semantic mistake.16 Suppose that Arthur 
is trying to sell a fake Rolex watch. He holds it out and says “this is a Rolex”. Then Arthur’s 
use of “Rolex” contravenes both (P1) and (P2). “Rolex” means Rolex, Arthur means Rolex by 
“Rolex”, and the watch in Arthur’s hand is not a Rolex—so, by both (P1) and (P2), Arthur 
(semantically) ought not to apply “Rolex” to the watch in his hand. The problem here is that 
lying is not a semantic mistake. Meaning and speaking-the-truth aren’t connected in this 
way.17 Meaning has implications for how to use words truthfully, not whether we ought to. If 
I tell a child that “Rolex” denotes watches made by Rolex, I am not thereby saying that she 
ought to use “Rolex” truthfully. Of course, none of this is to deny that Arthur ought not to 
apply “Rolex” to the watch in his hand. The point is that it would be a misdiagnosis to say 
that the ‘ought’ in question is semantic. 
Second, (P1) and (P2) fail to capture what I take to be intuitively clear-cut cases of 
semantic normativity.  
Slip-of-the-Tongue: Sara is walking at dusk in Spring with a friend, and notices that 
the streetlights are coming on. She thinks to mention this to her friend. However, just 
then, she overhears some passers-by commenting that the leaves are turning green. 
Acting upon her previous thought, Sara asserts “the leaves are coming on”. 
Sara, here, is accidentally using “leaves” to mean streetlights. Given that “leaves” means 
leaves, this seems to be, at least in part, a semantic mistake. Given that Sara meant the 
streetlights are coming on, she ought not to have asserted “the leaves are coming on”; rather, 
she ought to have asserted “the streetlights are coming on”. Consider a second story: 
                                                 
16 Cf. Hattiangadi 2009 
17 Cf. Wikforss 2001. 
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Wrong-Choice-of-Word: While marking an essay, Mike thought that the essay’s 
structure was in chaos. When it came to writing feedback, he had to stop for a 
moment to remember the corresponding adjective, before writing in the feedback 
section: “the essay structure is inchoate”. 
Mike, here, is mistakenly using “inchoate” to mean chaotic. Given that “inchoate” means 
inchoate, this seems to be, at least in part, a semantic mistake. Given that Mike meant the 
essay structure is chaotic, he ought not to have written “the essay structure is inchoate”; 
rather, he ought to have written “the essay structure is chaotic”. 
Neither (P1) nor (P2) capture the ‘oughts’ in Slip-of-the-Tongue or Wrong-Choice-of-
Word. According to (P1), neither Sara nor Mike have made any mistake at all: Sara meant 
streetlights by “leaves” and Mike meant chaotic by “inchoate”, so Sara was permitted to 
apply “leaves” to the streetlights and Mike was permitted to apply “inchoate” to the chaotic.  
In contrast, (P2) can attribute a mistake to Sara: as “leaves” means leaves, Sara ought 
not to have applied “leaves” to streetlights. But there are problems. First, (P2) misdiagnoses 
Sara’s mistake: Sara’s mistake wasn’t to apply “leaves” to non-leaves, it was to mean 
streetlights by a word that means leaves. Second, (P2) may fail to predict that Mike is doing 
anything wrong at all: if the student’s essay structure is inchoate (as well as chaotic), then 
(P2) predicts that Mike’s utterance is semantically in order. And, finally, (P2) only prohibits: 
it tells us how words ought not to be used. However, in Slip-of-the-Tongue, Sara ought to 
have said “streetlights” rather than “leaves”; and, in Wrong-Choice-of-Word, Mike ought to 
have said “chaotic” rather than “inchoate”.  
Now, none of this constitutes a knockdown argument against (P1) and (P2). But it 
suggests that, if meaning is normative, we might do better to capture it with something like 
the following: 
15 
  
(P3) e semantically-means m in S’s language → S ought to (S utters e ↔ S speaker-means 
m) 
Here, S is a speaker, e is a word, phrase or sentence, and m is a meaning. As before, the 
‘ought’ is to be understood as strictly semantic—it can be overridden by moral, legal, 
prudential and other norms. Here are some examples: 
• Slip-of-the-Tongue. In English, “the streetlights are coming on” means the 
streetlights are coming on and “the leaves are coming on” means the leaves are 
coming on. As such, given that Sara means the streetlights are coming on, she ought 
to utter “the streetlights are coming on” and she ought not to utter “the leaves are 
coming on”. 
• Wrong-Choice-of-Word. In English, “the essay structure is chaotic” means the essay 
structure is chaotic and “the essay structure is inchoate” means the essay structure is 
inchoate. As such, given that Mike means the essay structure is chaotic, he ought to 
write “the essay structure is chaotic” and he ought not to write “the essay structure is 
inchoate”. 
• Rolex. In English, “Rolex” means rolex. As such, he ought to: use “Rolex” if and 
only if he means Rolex. As he uses “Rolex” and means Rolex, he satisfies his 
semantic obligations. 
• Thingamajig. In English, “thingamajig” has no meaning and “carafe” means carafe. 
As such, Anna ought to: use “carafe” if and only if she means carafe. As Anna means 
carafe, she ought to use “carafe”. (But, as “thingamajig” has no meaning, there is no 
independent semantic reason for her not to mean carafe by “thingamajig”.) 
Before proceeding, let me make three points. 
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First, as it stands, (P3) is overly simplified. For example, (P3) will have to be 
developed to account for synonyms and expressions with multiple meanings. However, as a 
somewhat idealised model, (P3) will serve our purposes in what follows. 
Second, there are potential objections facing (P3) that I cannot address here—such as 
how it deals with metaphor and other ‘creative’ uses of language. However, firstly, it is not 
clear that (P1) or (P2) can deal with metaphor as they stand, either. Secondly, allowing the 
account to appeal to a notion of metaphorical meaning may resolve the problem easily.18 
And, thirdly, anyhow, it does not strike me as implausible that metaphor essentially involves 
contravening a semantic norm—good metaphors will nonetheless be justified on other (say 
aesthetic) grounds. 
Third, although (P3) officially generates a semantic ‘ought’, in some of what follows 
it will be convenient to talk of semantic reasons. I take these two ways of talking to be 
equivalent. 
4. Resolving the Objections 
I begin by explaining how to supplement the Austerity Framework with the above account of 
semantic normativity, before turning to the Normativity and Topic Continuity Objections. 
4.1 Supplementing the Austerity Framework 
To supplement the Austerity Framework with the above account of semantic normativity, we 
need first to supplement it with the semantic/speaker meaning distinction. This is 
straightforward, as the Austerity Framework is built upon an externalist metasemantics, and 
such metasemantic theories typically contain the distinction already. In particular, on 
                                                 
18 E.g. Skulsky 1986. 
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Kripke/Putnam-style externalism, the semantic reference of a word w is fixed by the 
underlying structure of the stuff that speakers refer to when using w. Nonetheless, it’s worth 
spelling out in a little more detail how the distinction fits into the Austerity Framework. 
• According to the framework, meaning consists of intension and extension. As such, 
we can understand the semantic meaning of an expression to consist of the intension 
and extension assigned to it by the relevant language. Likewise, what a speaker means 
by an expression consists of the intension and extension that the speaker intends the 
expression to have. 
• Conceptual engineering targets semantic meaning. That is, conceptual engineers are 
seeking to change the intensions and extensions that are assigned to the relevant 
expressions by the relevant language. For example, the astronomers were trying to 
change the meaning of the word “planet” as used in (academic) English. 
• The framework, as it stands, puts no specific constraints on what a speaker can mean 
by an expression. If a speaker can intend to mean m by “planet”, she can thereby 
mean m by “planet”. But, importantly, such a speaker is not thereby speaking a 
language in which “planet” means m. 
With the speaker/semantic meaning distinction in place, we can now make a few comments 
about the implications of (P3) for the Austerity Framework. 
• When the semantic meaning of an expression changes, the semantic norms also 
change. If “salad” previously denoted only green-leaf dishes but now also denotes 
(say) mozzarella and tomato slices drizzled with olive oil, then speakers now ought to 
mean something broader by “salad” than what speakers ought to have meant by 
“salad” before the change. 
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• A conceptual engineer is, in effect, seeking to change the semantic norms. If one 
successfully changes the semantic meaning of an expression, one thereby changes 
what one ought to mean by that expression.  
• Conceptual engineering will almost certainly involve breaking semantic norms. 
Conceptual engineers tend to change what they speaker-mean by the target expression 
immediately. But any change in semantic-meaning will almost certainly be a long-
term, drawn-out affair. As such, even when amelioration is ultimately successful, 
there is likely to be a period during which conceptual engineers speaker-mean 
something by an expression that semantically-means something else. (I do not take 
this to be problematic: revolutions typically involve breaking norms to change those 
norms.) 
4.2 Resolving the Normativity Objection  
The Normativity Objection states that the Austerity Framework fails to account for the 
normativity in conceptual engineering. There are two aspects to this. First, there are particular 
normative claims—such as (1a)–(2b)—that the Austerity Framework is not well placed to 
capture. Second, as the framework does not currently provide sensible strategies for 
amelioration, it is not clear that it leaves room for any normativity in conceptual engineering 
at all. 
I take the two aspects in reverse order. First, then, we need a strategy for effecting 
changes in semantic meaning. Given the account of semantic normativity I have been 
sketching, I think that there is an obvious strategy. Notice three things. Firstly, given (P3), to 
change the semantic-meaning of an expression is to change what one semantically-ought to 
mean in using that expression. Secondly, what one semantically-ought to mean by an 
expression is typically tied closely to what other speakers in the community typically mean 
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by that expression. Thirdly, the more that a speaker notices others using an expression to 
mean m, the more likely she is to use that expression to mean m. All of this suggests the 
following strategy: 
 The Prominent Usage Strategy. In order to change the semantic meaning of e to m, 
one might seek to mean m by e as widely and prominently as possible. 
This, I suggest, is a sensible strategy: wide, prominent uses of e in which the speaker means 
m are more likely to encourage others to use e similarly, which is more likely to lead to e 
coming to semantically mean m. 
Two points of clarification. Firstly, I do not claim that the Prominent Usage Strategy 
is a strategy with a high, or even moderate, success rate. In fact, I would expect almost all 
uses of the Prominent Usage Strategy to fail. Most people just do not hold much sway over 
others; those who do hold sway are not in control of precisely how others use their words; 
and other external factors (e.g. the mircostructure of natural kinds) which no one controls are 
also involved in the determination of semantic meaning. However, all of this is just to say 
that the strategy is compatible with the Austerity Framework, and with Inscrutability and 
Uncontrollability in particular. Nonetheless, for those seeking to ameliorate an expression, 
the Prominent Usage Strategy is a sensible strategy to follow. It is, as it were, a good starting 
point. 
Secondly, the strategy assumes that we are in control of what we mean by our 
expressions. From the perspective of the Austerity Framework, this may be an idealisation: 
external factors may also be involved in determining mental content and, in particular, the 
content of our intentions to mean things. Nonetheless, I take it that we have greater control 
over speaker meaning than semantic meaning—and that is all that is required for the 
Prominent Usage Strategy to be a sensible strategy. 
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Given the Prominent Usage Strategy, it is plausible to say that conceptual engineers 
‘should keep trying’—although ameliorating an expression will be extremely difficult, we 
have at least a strategy for amelioration. This makes room for normativity in conceptual 
engineering: we should try to ameliorate our concepts in broadly the same sense that we 
should try to reduce crime in Baltimore and lessen poverty in Bangladesh. As things stand, 
however, this does not yet capture the full extent of normativity in conceptual engineering. 
So let me now explain how we can account for (1a)–(2b). First, recall (1a–b): 
(1a) The astronomers were right to (re)define “planet”. 
(1b) Had the astronomers continued to use “planet” without (re)defining it, they would 
have been doing something wrong. 
Prior to amelioration, “planet” had no clear intension and an extension with prominent 
borderline cases. Call the semantic meaning of “planet” prior to amelioration mOLD. The 
astronomers had good theoretical reason not to mean mOLD by “planet”, despite a conflicting 
semantic reason to mean mOLD by “planet”. Plausibly, given the strength of the theoretical 
reason, the astronomers had overriding reason to mean by “planet” something other than 
mOLD. However, this would have led to astronomers violating a semantic norm—by (P3), they 
semantically ought to mean mOLD by “planet”. This violation could be avoided by (re)defining 
“planet”—so the astronomers were right to try to (re)define “planet”. This serves to explain 
(1a) and (1b). 
Now recall (2a–b): 
(2a) Having voted for the new definition of “planet”, the astronomers were right to treat 
“planet” as having that new definition—regardless of whether the astronomers had 
successfully changed the meaning of “planet”. 
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(2b) Having voted for the new definition of “planet”, had the astronomers not treated 
“planet” as having that new definition, they would have been doing something 
wrong—regardless of whether the astronomers had successfully changed the meaning 
of “planet”. 
The purpose of voting for a new definition of “planet” was ultimately to change the semantic 
meaning of “planet”—which, I will assume, the astronomers had good reason to try to do. 
Call the meaning the astronomers voted for mNEW. So, having voted for mNEW, the astronomers 
had good reason to try to change the semantic meaning of “planet” from mOLD to mNEW. 
Perhaps the clearest strategy for effecting this change is the Prominent Usage Strategy. This 
involves meaning mNEW by “planet”—which is to treat “planet” as meaning mNEW. So, the 
astronomers plausibly had good reason to treat “planet” as having the new definition 
regardless of the semantic meaning of “planet”. All things considered, then, in attempting to 
change the semantic meaning of “planet”, the astronomers were right to break the semantic 
norm to use “planet” to mean mOLD and to, instead, use “planet” to mean mNEW—and, likewise, 
the astronomers would have been wrong not to do this. This serves to explain (2a) and (2b). 
The explanations above are tentative. This is because the Planet Case is complex. 
Nonetheless, I think that the explanations are highly plausible, and accurately reflect the 
complexity of the case. I said in §2.1 that the astronomers’ theoretical aims, the norms of 
inquiry and the norms governing language all seem to contribute to why they were right to act 
as they did. This point is borne out, I think, by the explanations above. 
4.3 Resolving the Topic-Continuity Objection 
The Topic-Continuity Objection is that the Austerity Framework, as it stands, fails to 
alleviate the concern raised by Strawson-style objections—the concern that amelioration will 
simply change the subject. 
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To begin note that, plausibly, we should not take astronomers to have changed the 
subject by ameliorating “planet”: we should not take the planetary sciences to have begun in 
2006. Here is a conjecture about why the astronomers’ amelioration seems appropriate: the 
astronomers’ theoretical reason to mean mNEW by “planet” outweighed their semantic reason 
to mean mOLD by “planet”. If this is right, then the astronomers were right to seek to change 
the meaning of “planet” to mNEW. Had their theoretical reason not outweighed their semantic 
reason, then the astronomers ought instead to have introduced a new term by which to mean 
mNEW. Intuitively, this marks a normative difference between topic continuity and changing 
the subject: if you are continuing on the same topic, then you ought to use the same word; but 
if you are changing the topic, then you ought to introduce a new word. 
Before generalising the suggestion, an important clarification is in order. I have 
suggested that we should not take the astronomers to have changed the subject because their 
theoretical reason outweighed their semantic reason. What is the significance of their reason 
being theoretical? Consider the following points. 
• Expressions typically have different (semantic) meanings in different areas of 
discourse. “Valid argument” means one thing in philosophy, another thing in 
everyday language. 
• Whether we should take amelioration to count as a change of subject may depend on 
the area of discourse. For example, perhaps we should take an explicit (re)definition 
of “human right” in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to constitute 
a change of subject in (academic) philosophy, but not in politics. Similarly, perhaps 
we should take the astronomers to have preserved the subject in astronomy, but to 
have changed the subject in astrology. 
• Suppose the semantic meaning of e is successfully changed to m. Whether we should 
take this to be a change of subject in an area of discourse is likely to depend on 
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whether the discourse-appropriate reason for meaning m by e outweighs the relevant 
semantic reason. Plausibly, the astronomers’ reason for meaning mNEW by “planet” 
was appropriate for astronomy, but not for astrology.  
Exactly how to understand a ‘discourse-appropriate reason’ is not something I can explore 
here. But, at an intuitive level, the idea is reasonably clear: philosophical reasons are 
discourse-appropriate to philosophy; scientific reasons are discourse-appropriate to science; 
theoretical reasons are discourse-appropriate to inquiry more generally; political reasons are 
discourse-appropriate to politics; and so on. 
We can now generalise the idea.  
The Topic-Continuation Thesis. Suppose that one seeks to ameliorate e, changing its 
semantic meaning from mOLD to mNEW, in area of discourse D. Then we should count an 
amelioration as preserving the topic in D iff one’s D-appropriate reason for meaning 
mNEW by e outweighs the semantic reason for meaning mOLD by e. 
This, I suggest, provides us with an understanding of the kinds of situation in which we 
should count amelioration to fall within the limits of revision.19 
Where does this leave the Contestation Theory? As Cappelen does not spell out the 
theory in detail, I am not sure. But I take it that, in many cases, it will be to some extent up 
for negotiation whether (i) a reason is D-appropriate and (ii) one reason outweighs another. 
As such, at the very least, the Topic-Continuation Thesis is offered in the spirit of the 
Contestation Theory—regardless of whether they are compatible. 
                                                 
19 Something like the Topic-Continuation Thesis underlies my ‘explication defence of arguments from reference’ (2017b), 
although I had not formulated the thesis at that time. 
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5. Conclusion 
I have argued for supplementing the Austerity Framework with an account of semantic 
normativity. This move is important, I think, because conceptual engineering is a normative 
enterprise, and so semantic norms have an important role to play in understanding the 
enterprise. The aim of conceptual engineering is not merely to change language, but to make 
it better. However, one’s reason for improving language come into conflict with pre-existing 
semantic norms. Understanding the interplay between these norms is, I suggest, key to 
understanding conceptual engineering. For this reason, with regard to the kind of points I 
have made, there is nothing special about the Austerity Framework. Semantic normativity 
should play a key role in how we understand conceptual engineering.20 
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